General Bruce C. Clarke, 7th Armor Division CCB
 Josh Cline – The Army Historical Foundation

Clarke was transferred to a unit that had suffered top-down leadership trouble, CCB of the 7th Armored Division, on 1 November 1944. His new superior, Brigadier General Robert Hasbrouck, ordered Clarke “to retrain this division. I want it trained like the 4th Armored. You’re going to be the trainer.” Clarke knew the way to fight the war in tanks and instilled those methods in a unit that had lost faith in previous commanders. On 7 December 1944, Hasbrouck pinned the star of a brigadier general on Clarke. Nine days later the Battle of the Bulge began.

On 16 December, the town of St. Vith was defended by the ill-fated 106th Infantry Division. The entire German counteroffensive reliedå on supply routing through St. Vith for two whole panzer armies. Consequently, those two armies attacked Major General Alan Jones’s undermanned and inexperienced division. Two of Jones’s units, the 422d and 423d Infantry Regiments, became surrounded as the result of miscommunication. Major General Troy Middleton, commander of VIII Corps, dispatched Clarke and CCB to support Jones. By 1030 on 17 December, Clarke had arrived; by 1400, Jones turned to Clarke and said, “You take command, I’ll give you all I have…I’ve lost a division quicker than any division commander in the U.S. Army.”

Clarke began the Battle of St. Vith as a traffic cop, personally directing units into St. Vith throughout the night of 17 December. Captain Dudley Britton of the 23d Armored Infantry Battalion commented, “That day I saw the highest ranking traffic cop I have ever seen.” Clarke’s CCB had to force their way upstream of retreating units; his opposite number, General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel, also spent that night as a traffic cop, organizing the build-up for attacking St. Vith.

Clarke employed CCB of the 7th Armored at St. Vith just as he had CCA of the 4th Armored at Arracourt. Manteuffel believed there was a full tank corps at St. Vith. In reality, what he saw was the same battalion of tanks constantly moving between positions. On 18 December Clarke was ordered to hold St. Vith for three days. These orders forced Clarke and his command to face overwhelming odds while coordinating units from several divisions during a confusing command situation (every other general present, deferring to him, were superiors in rank or time in grade).

German units forced the 106th’s two surrounded regiments to surrender on 19 December. On the night of 20-21 December, Germans penetrated into St. Vith, though CCB still held the surrounding area. German vehicles flooding into St. Vith caused a giant traffic jam in a combat zone, ironically becoming victims of their own success. 21 December marked the fifth day of CCB’s defense of St. Vith, and the fourth of three days they had been ordered to hold out. Clarke’s troops were beyond exhausted. 

On 22 December, Major General Matthew D. Ridgway, commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, ordered the 7th Armored Division to remain near St. Vith to create a “fortified goose-egg” and fight surrounded, as was happening with the 101st Airborne Division in Bastogne. Clarke reported his force was only about forty percent effective and still engaged. Referencing the 7th Cavalry at Little Big Horn, Clarke commented that the plan for the 7th Armored looked “like Custer’s last stand to me.” 

Ridgway was overruled by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, Ridgway’s superior officer. “You have accomplished your mission…it is time to withdraw.” The 7th Armored Division had held for a full week when asked to hold three days. “They can come back with all honor… They put up a wonderful show,” Montgomery said. At 0500 on 23 December, Hasbrouck informed all units, “It will be necessary to disengage, whether circumstances are favorable or not, if we are to carry out any kind of withdrawal.” By 1000, at the tail end of his column, Clarke’s jeep roared across the escape bridge at Vielsalm, which was blown behind him. The exhausted brigadier general fell asleep in the passenger seat.

Manteuffel met Clarke twenty years later at an event marking the anniversary of the defense of St. Vith. In a later letter, Manteuffel wrote, “The brilliant, outstanding delaying action around St. Vith was decisive for the drive of my troops and for the Sixth SS Panzer Army too…the battle of St. Vith was of greatest consequences for the two armies—and the whole German offensive. In the end, St. Vith fell, but the momentous main drive of the LVIII Panzer Corps had been destroyed.” In Eisenhower’s Lieutenants, Russell Weigley asserted that “more perhaps than any other… it was the battle of St. Vith that bought the time required by Allied generalship to recapture control of the [Battle of the Bulge].”

Clarke’s CCB was awarded a Distinguished Unit Citation (now known as the Presidential Unit Citation) for their actions between 17 to 23 December. Clarke himself was awarded a Bronze Star with “V” device. He refused a higher decoration, believing that too many of his officers and men had no opportunity to have their own deeds recorded. “I am [prouder] of that Bronze Star than of my DSC and three Silver Stars. I believe I deserved it more than the other decorations.” 

Lieutenant General Clarke (left) and Lieutenant General Lee Hyung-geun (center), commanding general of the Republic of Korea I Corps, discuss I Corps’ new Noncommissioned Officers Academy with General Maxwell D. Taylor, commanding general of Eighth Army, 26 September 1953. (National Archives)

Colonel Jerry Morelock, in his book, Generals of the Ardennes, a study of American commanders in the Battle of the Bulge, had this to say of Clarke’s actions in the battle: 

Clarke’s most dominant leadership characteristics…was a supreme and total self-confidence…he never doubted his own abilities, nor was he ever shy about stepping forward to take charge or expressing his opinion about any military subject…Without much guidance he knew what needed to be done; drawing on his combat experience, he knew how to go about doing it; he projected self-confidence and competence which inspired his staff and troops; and, perhaps above all, he saw it through to a successful ending.23 

After Clarke led CCB to retake St. Vith a month later, he was flown to England to have his gall bladder and thirty-eight gallstones removed; Clarke had delayed treatment and had self-medicated the pain with high amounts of codeine for months. He returned on 1 June 1945. On 20 June he was reassigned back to the 4th Armored Division, this time as commanding general, but he only held the position for a few days. Clarke was requested by General Douglas MacArthur and sent to the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Operations during the planning for the invasion of Japan, to serve as an engineer officer. He was building a logistics brigade for the invasion of Japan, a role he served in from June to August 1945 when World War II ended.

The Full Article

A “DAMNED NOBODY” TO FOUR STARS: THE LIFE AND CAREER OF GENERAL BRUCE C. CLARKE by Joshua Cline